- First of all there is no desire on part of the government to restore peace in northern Uganda.
- Secondly, there is no clear assessment of the reason for the war.
- And lastly, the venue for peace talk is not conducive to peace talk.
Below is the excerpt.
In spite of the defeat of Lakwena in 1987 and the 1988 peace accords, the war up to 1991 continued in much the same vein as it had prior to these events. A.G.G Pinycwa has commented that, "It is the persistence of the rebellion despite the defeat of Alice Lakwena in 1987 that irked and prompted Major General David Tinyefuza [sic] to launch the four month (April to July) intensive military operation of 1991 in which much of the Northern Region was for some time held incommunicado with the rest of the country ."(18) In fact, by Tinyefunza's own account to Parliament in 1996, as Minister of State for Defense in 1991, he should not have been the one to conduct this operation. However, the situation on the ground was such that the rebels appeared to be winning the war controlling the administration centers of both districts. In Tinyefunza's own words "I told you (Parliament) the army in Gulu was under siege; rebels were camped at Gulu post office The forces of the enemy had occupied Pajim barracks and the town of Kitgum "(19) Operation North, as this 1991 operation was known, is said to have been extremely brutal and, by many accounts, fueled feelings of disdain by Acholi toward the NRM. Though Operation North failed in its ultimate objective to end the insurgency once and for all, it took some time for the LRA to collect itself and the next couple of years saw a reduction in rebel activity.
Friday, March 18, 2005
Peace Related Work
This excerpt from Online Journal of Peace whose web address is given below may shed light in why peace talks have been failing in Uganda. There is a general underlying effort to 'finish them off' that makes government to aim at capturing rebel leaders during peace talks instead of conducting sincere talks.